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Can the United States Export Democracy?
Mary Fran T. Malone
Department of Political Science 
Today we hear politicians, pundits, and the  public grapple with this question, particularly as the United States struggles to guide demo-
cratization in Afghanistan and Iraq. This question is 
far from new, however, as democracy promotion has 
featured prominently in U.S. rhetoric for some time. In 
some cases, the U.S. encouraged democratization with 
carrots, dangling financial incentives in the faces of 
countries contemplating free and fair elections.  
In others, the U.S. used a stick, sending the electoral 
ballots in with the marines. Have these efforts worked? 
Can the U.S. export democracy with carrots, sticks, or 
some combination of the two? A historical review of the 
empirical evidence provides some fascinating answers 
to these questions. Based upon this evidence, this paper 
argues that the method of exporting democracy is not 
nearly as important as commitment: be it through the 
carrot or the stick, to export democracy successfully the 
United States must fully fund and staff its democratiza-
tion efforts. 
Promoting Democracy: A Historical 
Overview
Democracy promotion first featured prominently in 
U.S. foreign policy rhetoric in the aftermath of the 1898 
Spanish American War. Defeat of the Spanish propelled 
the U.S. to superpower status, and as a superpower, 
the U.S. sought to increase its influence in the west-
ern hemisphere. From 1898–1933, the marines were 
dispatched approximately 30 times to Latin American 
countries and occupied some nations as long as 34 
years. Frequently, the U.S. cloaked its interventions 
under the guise of democracy promotion. U.S. leaders 
argued that such active intervention was necessary in 
order to promote democracy throughout the region. 
However, critics noted that the countries with the most 
U.S. intervention (e.g., El Salvador, Guatemala, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua) also had repres-
sive authoritarian governments. Furthermore, critics 
pointed out that patterns of U.S. intervention were not 
conducive to democratization, but they did succeed in 
promoting U.S. economic interests. Indeed, President 
Teddy Roosevelt’s foreign policy was known as “Dollar 
Diplomacy” due to its heavy focus on the protection of 
U.S. economic interests. 
As early as 1928, U.S. officials themselves began 
to criticize democracy promotion tactics. President 
Hoover argued, “True democracy is not and cannot be 
imperialistic,” and he pledged to reverse the policy of 
democratization by invasion. Five years later President 
Franklin Roosevelt went even further and launched his 
“Good Neighbor Policy.” Under the Good Neighbor 
Policy, the U.S. would withdraw all of its troops from 
Latin America, refrain from future intervention, and 
emphasize diplomatic consultations and negotiations. 
The U.S. adhered to this policy until World War II, and 
while the Good Neighbor Policy promoted trade and 
U.S. investment, it still did not improve democratiza-
tion of the region any better than its predecessor.
The Good Neighbor Policy was interrupted by World 
War II. In the aftermath of this war, the U.S. renewed its 
commitment to democratization, this time on a much 
larger global scale. Even the strongest critics of U.S. for-
eign policy tend to agree that at least in the cases of Ger-
many and Japan, the rhetoric matched the action. The 
U.S. was genuinely interested in reconstructing Germa-
ny and Japan and transforming them into democracies 
(with capitalist economies). In Japan, democratization 
was choreographed by approximately 5,500 occupation 
officials, backed by the power of 150,000 troops. With 
complete control over Japanese territory, occupation of-
ficials moved quickly to dismantle military and police 
institutions, overhaul legal and educational systems, 
and author a new constitution. Democratization in Ger-
many followed a similar pattern. Once again, foreign 
troops fully occupied German territory and became the 
de facto government for four years. Differences among 
the victorious Allies led to a division of Germany; 
however, France, Great Britain, and the U.S. were all 
committed to establishing a strong democratic state. 
Meticulous care was taken to design democratic institu-
tions that would rectify the flaws that led to the collapse 
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of democracy and the rise of fascism in the 1930s. The 
resulting German system had numerous provisions that 
staunchly upheld human rights and government stabil-
ity, while thwarting attempts of one political party to 
monopolize control of the country. By the end of the 
1950s, democratization in Germany and Japan was con-
sidered an overwhelming success.
While the U.S. was strongly committed to democ-
ratization of Germany and Japan, it would be incor-
rect to characterize U.S. foreign policy as centered on 
democracy promotion during the Cold War. Just as 
democracy was taking root in Germany and Japan, the 
U.S. pursued a very different strategy in places like Gua-
temala. In 1954, the U.S. helped to overthrow the leader 
of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz. Elected democratically 
in 1950, Arbenz aimed to transform Guatemala’s feudal 
economy into a modern capitalist state. He pledged that 
this transformation would benefit all Guatemalans, tar-
geting in particular the rural poor, of which 70% were 
illiterate and only 18% had access to potable water. Un-
fortunately for Arbenz, the U.S. found two major flaws 
in his plan for economic transformation. First, his eco-
nomic plan included the appropriation of unused land 
owned by the United Fruit Company—a company with 
strong ties to the Eisenhower administration that did 
not like the compensation package offered by the Gua-
temalan government. Second, while Arbenz was not a 
communist himself, there were communist sympathiz-
ers in his government. The U.S. deemed Arbenz too soft 
on communism as well as too quick to seize the land 
of an American company. The C.I.A. began to train a 
group of disenchanted Guatemalan military officers to 
overthrow the government, and in 1954, they helped 
launch a successful military coup against Arbenz. The 
overthrow of Arbenz plunged the country into four de-
cades of civil war; not until 1996 would Guatemala find 
itself at peace, ready to start the process of democratiza-
tion again.
Another prominent case of the U.S. reversing demo-
cratization occurred in Chile, which up until 1973 
enjoyed a long democratic tradition. Chileans demo-
cratically elected President Salvador Allende with a 
razor thin plurality of the vote in 1970. Allende was a 
self-proclaimed Marxist who pledged to find a “Third 
Way” for Chilean economic development by incorporat-
ing some elements of socialism into Chilean democracy. 
Allende aimed to fund his poverty-reducing initiatives 
by expanding state ownership of key economic areas—
particularly the copper industry. American companies 
were heavily vested in the Chilean copper industry, and 
American investment in Chile was estimated at $1 bil-
lion. The Nixon administration labeled Allende  
a threat and aimed to overthrow him. In 1973, the U.S. 
supported Augusto Pinochet’s military attack that led to 
the death of Allende as well as Chile’s long democratic 
tradition. Pinochet ruled Chile with an iron fist until 
the end of the Cold War.
U.S. policy throughout the Cold War is marked by 
examples of democracy promotion as well as democracy 
reversal. However, in the aftermath of the Cold War, 
the U.S. began to take the task of democracy promo-
tion more seriously, assisting democratization in the 
developing world in myriad ways. In some cases, the 
U.S. used financial incentives, or carrots, encourag-
ing authoritarian regimes to democratize by providing 
technical assistance, loans, and grants. If such regimes 
proved hesitant to start democratic transformations, the 
U.S. would take these carrots away, leaving developing 
countries without access to the economic assistance 
they desperately needed. On the other hand, the U.S. 
has demonstrated that it is not averse to using a stick ei-
ther. In Panama, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the U.S. 
democratized from the barrel of a gun, invading coun-
tries and leaving democratic institutions in its wake. 
Assessing the Success of Carrots and Sticks
When one examines the track record of U.S. democracy 
promotion after the Cold War, the results are mixed. 
In some cases, the carrots have worked extraordinarily 
well, as nations have begun to adopt democratic insti-
tutions and procedures in response to U.S. financial 
incentives. Such was the case in Chile, where in a dra-
matic turnaround the U.S. pressured Pinochet to step 
down and provided financial support to pro-democracy 
groups challenging his reign. These financial incentives 
worked extraordinarily well, leading to the downfall of 
Pinochet and the renewal of a strong and vibrant demo-
cratic government. In South Africa, the racist regime of 
apartheid crumbled in the face of U.S. and international 
economic sanctions and boycotts. The U.S. banded 
together with the rest of the global community to sup-
port democracy activist Nelson Mandela as he emerged 
from decades of imprisonment to become the first black 
South African president. With international assistance 
and against all odds, Mandela led his country from the 
brink of civil war to establish the first multiracial, dem-
ocratic government in South African history. 
In other cases, however, the carrots have languished. 
For example, while Guatemala received substantial 
amounts of U.S. aid, democracy has proven to be quite 
hollow, as former coup plotters and human rights abus-
ers have undermined the constitution in order to run 
We Hold These Truths
for office. Guatemalans tend to evaluate democratic 
progress in their country in negative terms; in some 
cases, up to 30% of the population believes that democ-
racy does not really exist in the country. Venezuela also 
received substantial sums of U.S. and international as-
sistance throughout the 1990s, particularly to reform 
its judicial branch. This assistance did not succeed in 
halting the demise of the party system in the country, 
or in preventing the rise of a former coup plotter, Hugo 
Chavez, to the presidency. In yet another twist, from the 
U.S. perspective democracy worked perhaps too well 
in Nicaragua, where last year Nicaraguans democrati-
cally elected longtime U.S. nemesis Daniel Ortega to 
the presidency. Still, while financial incentives are not 
always sufficient to establish democracy, on average the 
track record is positive. A recent cross-national study 
of U.S. foreign assistance on democracy building found 
that while there are exceptions (and these exceptions 
should not be overlooked), countries that have received 
U.S. financial assistance to promote democracy have 
succeeded in doing so. That is, recipients of U.S. aid on 
average tend to be more democratic than non-recipients. 
Democracy with a stick has a more checkered past in 
the post-Cold War era. Invasion was eventually success-
ful in promoting democracy in Panama, yet has become 
mired in insurgency in Iraq. In Panama, the U.S. was 
guided by the Powell Doctrine, which stated that if the 
U.S. were to invade, it must do so with overwhelming 
force. To invade a country of approximately 2.5 mil-
lion, the U.S. relied upon 26,000 troops. While the U.S. 
quickly ousted dictator Manuel Noriega and secured 
control of Panamanian territory, democratization was 
a long and tenuous process. The U.S. invaded Panama 
at the end of 1989, ostensibly to arrest Noriega for drug 
trafficking, yet realistically democracy did not take root 
until 1994, when the economy began to recover and 
newly elected President Balladares began to overhaul 
and democratize Panamanian institutions.
In contrast to the successful (albeit slow) democra-
tization of Panama, subsequent attempts at democra-
tization by invasion have proven less successful. Today 
Iraq and Afghanistan feature most prominently in the 
media; however, in 1994 the U.S. encountered similar 
problems on a much smaller scale in Haiti. To address 
massive human rights abuses occurring in Haiti and 
stem the tide of refuges headed towards the U.S., Presi-
dent Clinton authorized an invasion to remove the dic-
tator Raoul Cédras from power and establish a demo-
cratic regime. Six hours after launching the invasion, 
the dictatorship agreed to step down, opening the path 
for democracy. Skipping the invasion, the U.S. moved to 
the occupation phase, using more than 20,000 troops to 
control Haiti and assume temporary control of the gov-
ernment. While a large force was initially sent to occupy 
Haiti, by 1995 this force was replaced by 6,000 U.N. 
peacekeepers. By 1996, this mission had dwindled to 
600. As U.S. and international commitment waned, so 
did prospects for democracy. Political instability, lack-
luster economic performance, and social unrest spiraled 
out of control, engulfing the nation in violence and 
chaos. Today prospects for democracy in Haiti remain 
dim, as pro-democracy leaders have not succeeded in 
maintaining control over the country.
These contrasts between Panama and Haiti raise sev-
eral interesting questions concerning U.S. strategies for 
democracy promotion in Iraq and Afghanistan today. 
What can we learn from past experiences with democ-
racy promotion to inform U.S. strategies today? First, 
it appears that success is possible with both carrots and 
sticks, yet so is failure. When distinguishing between 
the successful and unsuccessful cases, it appears that 
the deciding factor is commitment. Democratization 
is a long process that requires sustained commitment 
in terms of monetary and personnel resources. Second, 
democratization rarely proceeds in a linear fashion. 
Rather, it advances in spurts and occasional setbacks. 
Initial successes can easily be reversed, which is why 
it is essential to sustain close ties with democratizing 
countries to provide the needed assistance—not leave 
prematurely as soon as things start to improve. Finally, 
it is important to remember that the rest of the global 
community might be suspicious of U.S. motives for 
promoting democracy. While the U.S. most certainly 
was dedicated to promoting democracy in places like 
Japan and Germany, in cases like Chile, the record is a 
bit uneven, as the U.S. was willing to promote as well as 
reverse democratization. A familiarity with past efforts 
of democracy promotion can help the U.S. formulate 
successful foreign policy and understand global percep-
tions of U.S. efforts.
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